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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah
'l'HOl\IAS B. PETERSON, COLEEN

r.

PB'l'ERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellmit,

- vs. MIDWEST CONSTRUCTION, INC.

Case No.
10890

:\fIDWEST REALTY & FINANCE,

INC., A. D. COATS AND VAO
BOWERS,
Defendants-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action on an Earnest l\Ioney and Offer
to Purchase Agreement and also for Fraud in the m<luring the Plaintiffs to enter into the agreement.
DISPOSITION IN 'l'HE LO\VER COURT
Defendants' motion to dismiss the fraud action for
faihll'P to state a cause of action was granted and Defrindant, :Midwest Realty & Finance Inc.'s motion for
nnnmary judgment on all causes of action in Plaintiffs'
C'omplaint was granted.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEA:L
Reversal of the lower court's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs were negotiating with the Defendant, A.
D. Coats, to purchase a house which was to be built
by the Defendant, Midwest Construction Company in
the 1966 Utah Parade of Homes Show.
Plaintiff signed an Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase Agreement agreeing to purchase the
house and property at cost. Cost was estimated to be
between $25,000.00 and $27,000.00. The Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer To Purchase Agreement, provided
that an exact cost would be furnished prior to construction. The agreement was signed by the Plaintiff,
and Defendant A. D. Coats, an agent for Defendant,
.Midwest Realtv and Finance, Inc. (R-~3).
Construction was commenced, the Defendant did not
furnish an exact cost, nor did they mention any price
ehange.
vVhen construction was nearly completed, the Dt>f endants A. D. Coats, and Yao Bowers, induced Plaintiffs to move into the new home, and to deed their old
home and property over to Def Pndant .MidwPst RPalt»
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and Finance, Inc. This was done allegedly for the purpose of selling the old home for a down payment on the
new home. At this time no mention was made of a
price increase in the new home.
After settling down in the new home, Plaintiffs were
approached by Defendant Vao Bowers who informed
them that the price would have to he raised as the
cost exceeded their estimate. He asked them to sign an
agreement providing that Plaintiffs would pay full cost.
On this agreement, there was no estimate of cost. Plaintiff refused to sign stating that they had agreed on a
price between $25,000.00 and $27,000.00. Defendant Vao
Bowers told them that unless they signed they would
have to move out of the new home and would forfeit
their $1,000.00 deposit. The Plaintiffs acquiesced, after
rao Bowers wrote a limit of $30,000.00 on the subseqnrnt agreement.
Nothing more was said concerning the price until
some months later when the Plaintiffs were to close the
transaction. At that time, Defendant, A. D. Coats, told
them the cost ·was raised to $33,000.00. Plaintiffs refused,
IH'gotiations failed, and this snit was eommenced.
Plaintiffs pleaded four causes of action: The first
was for specific performance on the new property at
approximately $25,000 to $27,000; the second was in the
a]tprnative for

hn~ach

of eon tract: the third was for

fraud alleging the Defendants knew at the time they
induced Plaintiffs to sign the Eanwst 1\loney Receipt
and Offer to Purchase and/or when they induced Plaintiffs to move into the new home that they would not
adhere to their original estimate of between $25,000.00
and $27,000.00; the fourth cause of action was to require
Defendants to apply Plaintiffs' equity in their old home
to purchase price of their new home. Plaintiffs included
?.! idwest Realty & Finance Inc. as Defondant all(•ging·
that Midwest Construction Inc. was a mere conduit
through which l\Iidwest Realty & Finance Inc. concluded
its business and limited its liability and in the fraud
action on the grounds that Vao Bowers and A. D. Coats
were acting as agents for Defendant l\1idwest Realty
& Finance Inc_ when they committed the fraud. (R-1-G)
Defendant then made a motion to <lism;ss for failnrP
to state a cause of action. Tlw motion \Yas deniPd hy
.Judg<> Rt<>wart 11L HansPn. (R-9)
At th<> time of the above motion, Defendants also
made a motion for a more Definite statement alleging
that Plaintiffs had used the term Defondants \Yithout
allpo-ino·
sp<>cificallv• which Defendants had dorn~ \\'hat
h
h
acts and therefore, Defendants could not ans\\'er thl'
complaint . .Tndg0 Hans011 gnmtPd this motion. (R-11).
Plantifftl ammendecl their cornplant to spPeifically
nanw wh'eli Def<>ndants had dmw ,,-Jiat aets.

Judge Hansen then moved from the Law and Motion bench in the Third Judicial District and the newly
appointed Judge, Frank Wilkins, took his place.
Defendants then made another, identical, motion to
dismiss the fraud action for failure to state a cause of
action (R-21).
Judge Wilkins granted this motion.
'At the time of the above, Defendant, Midwest Realty
and Finance Inc. moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that it was not using the Defendant, Midwest
Construction Company as a conduit through which to
conduct their business and limit their liability. In support of this motion, Defendants attached an affidavit
of Defendant A. D. Coats, which alleged that the two
corporations were separate. The affidavit showed a
list of the stockholders and officers of the two corporations.
Judge Wilkins granted the motion for summary
judgment and Plaintiffs' appeal.
Plaintiffs' had no chance for discovery inasmuch
as Defendants had never answered Plaintiffs' complaint
prior to the motion to dismiss.
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ARGU'.\1EXT
POINT I
ALL MOTIONS TO DISMISS SHOULD HA VE BEEN
DENIED

PURSUANT

TO

UTAH

CODE

ANNO-

TATED SECTION 78-7-19.

As may be seen from the record and the facts as they
are quoted above, Defendants made a motion to ditm1iss
pursuant to rule 12(b) (6) Utah Rules of Civil Procecdure, which was denied by .Judge Stewart Ham;en.
Judge Hansen was then moved from the Law .Motion
Bench, 3rd Judicial District, and Judge Frank Wilkins
took his place. The Defendants, still not having answered Plaintiffs complaint, made another, identical motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12(h) (G).
rtah Code Annotated SPdion

7~-7-19

provi<lPS:

If an application for an order made to a
Judge of a Court in whieh tlw action or pn•ct·eding is pending is refusPd in whole or in part, or
is g-ranted conditionally, no suhseqm•nt appli<'ati on for the sanw order can lw rnadP to any otlwr
.J ndg-e PXCPpt of a hip:hPr court.

Dc•fPndant contends that tlw faets m the instant
cas(• falls \\·ithin the purview of Seetion 78-7-19. Tlw
onl>" Pvents which transpi1·ed hPhn•en the dt•ninl of tlw
first motion, ancl the raising of tlw spconrl, \\·ns tlw
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interjection of an a1110ndrd complaint by the Plaintiffs'.
Tlw amended complaint, in substance, was identical to
tlw original complaint. 1t differed only in that it specifically named which Defendants had done what, rather
nll(•ging g<>nerally the word Defendants, and it also
nll(•gpd that Defendant, Midwest Realty and Finance,
Jnr., was conducting business through Midwest Construction Company. The fraud causes of action at which Df'fondants' two 12(b)(6) motions WPre directed Wf'rf'
suhstantially identical.
Section 78-7-20 provides that a violation of the above
78-7-19 may be punishable as contempt. At the
hraring, Plaintiffs counsel raised the statute and asked
~eetions

for dismissal on that basis. Although he did not ask
for rontempt sanctions, he did argue that attorneys fees
~ltonld

hf' paid them for having rnadf' the sf'cond appear-

ance on the same motion. Plaintiff contends that it was
irnpropPr to bring the two l2(b)6) motions, and that
thl' low<'r rourt should have dismissed the second motion
on th<> basis of section 78-7-19.
POINT II
THE FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT
HA VE BEEN DISMISSED PURSUANT TO RULE
12(b)(6). PLAINTIFF'S ALLEATIONS WERE SUFFICIENT TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IN
FRAUD AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS.

s
At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants' motion was granted on th0 basis that tlw lllPl'l'
estimate contained in the Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase Agreement was not a sufficient representation to be the basis of a fraud cause of action. 1'ht>
fraud cause of action was dismissed as to all four Defendants.
The general rule is that an estimate or opm10n is
not a sufficient representation to support a cause of
action in fraud. However, there is a well reeognizcd
exception to that general rule if the person making tlw
estimate or the opinion was an ex1wrt and the Plaintiff
held him out to be such and if the f'stimate or the opinion
was given by the Defendant with knowledge that it ,,·a;,
false. See Sime v. Malouf 95 C.A.2d, 82, 212 P. 2d 94:6,
rt' hearing deni('d, 95 C.A. 2d 82, 213 P. 2d 788; 'l'enrr
1·. Sussman 120 Colo. 488, 210 P. :.M H!i. ProssPr stat<•s
thP rule as follows:
ThP courts lwve clPvdopPd nmrn>rmis PXC'l']ltions to thf' rul<• that misn•1H·es<•ntations of opinion an' not a has:s for n·lief. Appan•ntly all
of tlwsP may lw sm1mwd llll hy saying that tlw)'
involvP sitnationfi for spc•ci:.i 1 circnrnstanc·l'~: '"·Jiicli
mak<> it V<'ry n·asonnhl or iirnhahle that tlw
Plaintiff should acc<'l it tlH' D<'frnclant's op· n ion
and act npon it and so justify a rPlaxation of tlw
distrnst which is eonsidN<'<l admirable het11·c·Pll
bargaining opvonents . . . . Further, it has h<'Pn
1Pcoµ;nizP<l V<'l'Y oftPn that tlw <'Xpn•ssion ol' an
oprn .on m::i.y r·mTy \\'ith :t an irnph·d ass<'rtim1,
1•
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not only that the speaker knows no fact whjch
would preclude such an opinion, but that he does
know facts which justifies his opinion. There is
a general agreenwnt that such an assertion is to
be implied when the Defendant holds himself out
or is understood as having special knowledge of
the matter which is not available to the Plaintiff,
so that his opinion becomes in effect an assertion
summarizing his knowledge.
Posser,Thc Law of Torts, 566 (2d ed.) (1955) (and
the cases cited therein). Opinions, estimates, and promises in. contractual transactions all fall under the same
rule. Prosser, op. cit. supra. The court in McWilliams
r. Barnes, 172 Kan. 701, 242 P.2d 1063, stated "The
general rule applicable here is that a party defrauded in
the making of a contract who discovers that fraud after
having partly performed may continue with performance
and also have an action for damages." In Flemming v.
Flemming-Felt Company, 7 Utah 2d 293, 233 P.2d 712,
the Utah court stated that "under some circumstances it
may be possible to base the deception required in fraud
upon a state of mind by showing that a promissor has
a preeonceived determination not to perform his promise8."
It is precisely the exception to the general rule
which the Plaintiffs contend applies to the instant case.

The>" were dealing with a construction company, a real
P~tate company, and agents of both. It is their opinion
that tlwse agPnts <'OUkl qualify as experts at estimating
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the cost of the construction of the home. There is also
no doubt that the Defendants were in a much better
position to determine the cost of construction of the
home than the Plaintiffs. Also, Plaintiffs alleged that
the Defendants knew that the estimates were false at
the time they made them. Thus, Plaintiff's complaint,
under the rule in the cases cited in the previous paragraph, was sufficient to state a cause of action for fraud
and the motion to dismiss should have been denied.
It is always a factual question as to whether a
person making a misrepresentation, knew at the tinw of
so making that the representation was false. Plaintiffs
contend that such an inference may be based on the
mere fact that the esimate was approximately one-third
to one-quarter lower than the cost which Defendant subsequently represented as the cost of construction. Regardless \\·liether this inf Pr<~nce is sufficient to support
a fraud cause of action, Plaintiff should have at least
heen given a chance to discover facts which n1ight tend
to prove that A. D. Coats and Yao Bowers were experts
and whctlwr they knew at the time they represented the
('stimate to be between $25,000.00 and $27,000.00 that it
was incorrect and would attempt to raise thP priee to
$33,000.00; and whether they made the low estimafr
finly with the inh'nt to indnce the Plaintiffs to sign tlw
Earnest Thf onr.Y Receipt and Offrr to Purchasr Agr('<'ment, and to obtain the $1,000.00 deposit paid by Plaintiff. Assuming that the D0fendants did haw such knO\rlf-dge ancl intrnt, Plaintiffs would lrnve he(•n d<•framled.
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I'laint;ffs should have been given a chance to discover
tlwse facts and the cause of action should not have been
<lisrnissed under rule 12 (b) (6) URCP.
Plaintiffs also alleged in their third cause of action
that it was fraudulent for Defendants to induce Plaintiffs to move into the new home and deed their old home
over to Defendants without telling them that the costs
had exceeded the original estimate. This point was not
touched on in Defendant's motion to dismis or argument
on that motion. Plaintiffs' counsel raised the issue at
the argument on the motion but the lower court dismissed Plaintiffs' third cause of action in its entirety.
Assuming that the Defendants, Vao Bowers and
A. D. Coats did not know at the time they made the
f'stimate of $25,000.00 to $27,000.00 that it was low,
there may still have been a misrepresentation when they
induced Plaintiffs to move into the new home without
telling them that the costs had exceeded the original
l•stimate Pndoubtedly it would seem that at the timP
f'Onstruction was nearly completed and Defendants induced Plaintiffs to move, they should have known the
f'ost of construction had PXCPeded the $27 ,000.00. This
might he inferred from the fact that shortly therafter,
thr Defendant, Vao Bower approached Plaintiffs and
told them that the price had exceeded $27 ,000.00 and
asked them to sign an agreenwnt to the effect that they
1rnuld pa)· for eYPr)·thing that D<,f0ndants Pstimated to
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be the cost. The question is whether the mere silence in
not telling them that the costs had excPeded the Pstimat!·
is sufficient to support a fraud cause of action.
The general rule is that the Defendant has a duty
of disclosure where he has special knowledge or means
of knowledge not open to the Plaintiff and is a"·are that
the Plaintiff is acting under a misapprehension. Prosser
op. cit. supra at 535 and the cases cite,d therein. The Utah
court in Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 2G3, :.mo P. 2d G23
stated that a material nondisclosed or half-truth may
be the basis for an action for fraud. Tlw rule as statPd
m 23 Am.•Jr.§78, 85-1: is as follows:
The principal basic in the la\Y of fraud as it
related to nondisclosure is that a charge of fraud
is maintainable where a party knows material
facts and is under a dnt:•, under tlH~ circumstances, to speak and dis<'lose his information,
hut remains silent. . . . Oenerally speaking, hcmever, in the conduct of various transadions lwtween persons involving hrn.;inPss dealings and
commercial negotiations or otlwr relationships rrlatin bo- to IHOI)ertv• ' contracts ' rniscPllmwons right:::,
- .
there are times and oecasions , .. ·hen the law 1mJ)OSPS upon a party a duty to f-qwak ratlwr .than
rpmain silent in res1wct to ('ertain facts \nthlll
his lmowkdgP and thus to disclose information.
. . . Among other ways th(' ohligation to c0111rnnn icate facts niaY arise is from tlw fact that···
tlw party does ~ollldhing- or says sonwthing-,
whi<'h for \\·ant of cli::-;elosnn• is fah;p an<l clen·11tiv<', and is pla<'Nl or p]aC'<'i-' hirn~Plf in n po,.:ition
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where the silence will convey a false impression
. the fact that a statement or representa-'
or from
tion has been made in the bona fide belief that
it was true, and before it is acted upon the party
who has made it discovers that it is untrue.
See also the cases cited in 23 Am. Jur. ~ 79, 856. This
appPars to be the precise type of case as the instant
1:ase. Defendants' estimate was apparently low. Without saying anything, Defendants induced Plaintiffs to
move into the new home and deed their old property
over to Defendants. Plaintiffs did so apparently still
rPlying on the estimate of $25,000.00 to $27,000.00. A
question of fact exists as to whether Defendants knew
whether the estimate was low and still remained silent
1rhen they induced Plaintiffs to move. Regardless of
that factual issue, Plaintiffs' complaint is still sufficient
to state a cause of action in fraud based on nondisclosure.
The lower court should not have granted Defendants'
motion under 12(b) (6) URCP.

It appears that the Plaintiffs' allegations concerning
llw n•rn·psentation a,nd nondisclosure of the Defendants,
Vao Bowers and A. D. Coats were sufficient to support
a cause of action in fraud. Thus, the motion granting the
lllotion to dismiss against thesP Def Pndants was improper and should be reversed. Since it is claimed that
tlw Defendants Vao Bowers and A. D. Coats acted as
agents for the DPfendants, Midwest Construction Company and Midwest Realty & Finance Company, it was
al~o imprnp<'r to dismiss tlwsc• D<'frndants from the
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fraud cause of action. This is true even assmnmg the
Defendant, Midwest Realty & Finance Company, wa'
not conducting business through the Defcndan t constrrn·tion company and, thus, the corporate veil cannot be
pierced. They would still be liable under an agency
theory.
POINT III
DEFENDANT, MIDWEST REALTY & FINANCE,
INC., SHOULD NOT HA VE BEEN GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BEEN DISMISSED FROM
THE SUIT.

AN ISSUE OF FACT WAS RAISED

AS TO WHETHER THEY WERE CONDUCTING
BUSINESS THROUGH MIDWEST CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY_

Plaintiff's complaint joined l\fidwest R''alty &:. Finance, Inc., as Defendant in both tlH' fraud and the contract causes of actions. It is Plaintiffs' belief that tht>
Defendant, :Midwest Construction Company has ven·
little capital, if any. Plaintiffs furtlwr believe that the
Defendant construction company transfers the proceeds
from the sales of homes to the Mid\n'st Realty & Financt',
Inc. whil<' the liabilitie8 incurred remain with the construction company. It should be pointPd out that Plaintiffs' old honw which was to be used as a do\n1-1ia;·went
on the n<>w home was dePded over to Thi idwP8t Healt.1·
& Finanr<· In<". Defendant, .:\I id\Y<'St Realty & Financ·P,
ln<'. oh.i<'dPd to Plaintiffs' allPgations in a uwtion for
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summary judgment. In support of its motion, it attached
an affidavit sit,rned by the Defendant, A. D. Coats. This
affidavit simply listed primary stockholders and officers
of the two corporations, then went on to state conclusions
that the two corporations were separate entities.
Plaintiff contends that the Defendants' motion and
affidavit simply raised an issue of fact for the jury
to decide. Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P .2d
59. Therefore, it was not proper to dismiss the case
against Midwest Realty & Finance on summary judgment. Ibid; Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual
Insurar~ce Company, 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264. The
most recent Utah pronouncement on this issue, is found
in the opinion by Mr. Justice Ellett, in the case of June
Singleton v. George V. Alexander, and William J. Greer,
a ('o-zJartnership, dlNli Carefree Laundry, case number
10780 (August 15, 1967). In this case Judge Ellett
stated, ''It will be noted that a summary judgment can
lw granted only when it is shown that there is no genuine
i~sne as to any material fact ,and that the moving party
also is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under
thof.'P facts."
Th<>re may be an issue as thl' weight to give Def('ndants' affidavit, when Plaintiffs did not submit an
opposing affidavit. The general rule is "There is no
obligation on Plaintiff to establish hPr <:>ntire case in a
]ll"t>trial deposition. Summary relief cannot lw imposed
as trial hy affidavit: f.'nch rPlid is drastic and C'an only
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be imposed when all facts are admitted which are determinative of duty or right." Champlin vs. Oklahonw
Furniture Mom,ruff11cturing Company, 269 F.2d 918. Sometimes the rule is stated that an affidavit on summary
judgment may be used "not to decide any issue of fact
present, but solely to discover if any real issue of fact
exists. If there is an issue of fact to be determined, a
summary judgment cannot be entered." This is also
the rule in Utah. In the Utah case cited above, Singleton
vs. Ale:r;ander arnd Greer, dba Carefree Laundry, case
No. 10780 (August 15, 1967), Judge Ellett stated: "The
court cannot consider the weight of testimony or the
credibility of witnesses in considering a motion for summary judgment. He simply determines that there is no
disputed issue of any material fact and that as a matter
of law the party should prevail."
A qualification on the general rule is shown in
Dupler vs. Yeates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P. 2d 624. In this
case the Plaintiffs brought a fraud cause of action alleging he had relied on several misrepresentations of the
Defendants. It appeared that previously the same Plaintiffs had brought the same cause of action against different Defendants in a "\\Tyoming ca:se. In the Utah case,
the Defendant moved for summary judgment on the
gTounds of no reliance. In support thereof, he submitted certified copies of the ·Wyoming court proceedings, wherein the same Plaintiffs swore they had relied
on other persons who were the "\Vyoming Defendants.
The rtah court lwld that whPre tlw moving partiPs

i
I

I
I
I
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I

(·yidentuary material is in itself sllfficil'nt and the opposing party fails to vroffer any evidentiary matter when
h(' is presumahly in a position to do so, the court should
lie justified in concluding that no gPnuine issue of fact
i~ present, nor would be present at the trial. The Utah
eourt distinguish(~d between the affidavits which are
sdf-serving in nature, and affidavits containing documentary evidence which were in effect admissions by
thr Plaintiffs' against their own interest.

'1

"In contrast to the self-serving declarations
usually proferred by movants for summary judgment, these statements are made by the opposing
parties themselves . . . PresPnting at most, improbable qm•stions of credibility, these documentary statements have a high degree of probative
value. Furthermore, knowledge of reliance or
lack of it is within the peculiar province of the
Plaintiffs. It is not practicable to expect the
Defendants to present more convincing proof than
these contradictory assrrtions, hy those who Jrnm\·
the most concerning the qlwstion of reliance ...
Furthermore, tlw record contains the agreement
of August 20, 195G, between the Plaintiffs and
(the Defendants in the \Y.rnming cases) ... The
settlement agreement, . . . ra!sed tlw inforence
that the Plaintiffs are fully compPnsatPd for the
damao-e:-;
thc>v
a
. now s0ek to n'<'ff\'<'l' frnm the Defendants (in tlw Ftah rase )."

1'hns, as a factual matt(,r the Dupler casr is very distinguishable from the present case. The statPments and
the affidavits in the present easP an• s<>lf-spr-,ing. Fur-
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thennore, they pertain to matters peculiarly within the
knowledge of the Defendant, not the Plaintiffs. The
Plaintiffs could not be expected to controvert Defendants' avennent without a chance for discovery. Furthermore, in the Dupler case, the affidavit pleading satisfaction by the Plaintiffs was uncontroverted. Therefore,
Plaintiff submits that the facts in the Dupler case are
so distinguishable from the present case that it is not
conrolling. Furthermore, the rule in Dupler only goes
to determine whether a factual issue exists. It appears
from the pleadings of Plaintiffa when contrasted with
the affidavit of the Defendant, that there is a factual
issue in the present case, and that the affidavit of the
Defendant was used, contrary to the Dupler rule, to
determine the factual issue.
The affidavit of A. D. Coats, apparently made in his
capacity as officer for both corporations, Defendant,
Midwest Realty & Finance, lnc., and l\lidwest Construction Company, does not rule out the possibility that
the two corporations were acting in concert-or that DPf endant, Midwest Construction Company is a conduit
through which Defendant, l\lidwest Realty & FinancP,
Inc. conducts business. Sweeping aside the conclusions
in the affidavit to the effect that the two corporations
are separate entities, the only factual averments are who
th<> prineiple stoekholders and officers of the two corporations are. It should be pointed out that it appears
from the affidavit that a majority shareholder of l\fid,\.<'st RPalty & Finance, Tnc .. Rulon .)Pnkins, also O\rns
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20% of Midwest Construction Company. Furthermore,
it appears that the officers of Midwest Construction
Company are also officers of Midwest Realty & Finance,
Inc. From the service of the pleading, it appears that
the two corporations share a common office as well as
agent for service of process. Thus, it does not conclusively appear that Midwest Realty & Finance, Inc., and
Midwest Construction Company are distinctly separate
eorporate entities. Plaintiffs would like a chance to
discover if the assets of the two corporations are as
interchangeable as their officers. This could be inferred
from the fact that Plaintiffs old home was deeded over
to the finance company not the construction company.
The fact that some of the stockholers in one of the
corporations are not stockholders in the other corporation does not necessarily preclude the contention that
"Midwest Construction Company is a shell or conduit
through whieh Midwest Realty & Finance conducts businPss.
The normal case for piercing the corporate veil,
would be where the officers of the two corporations are
identical rather than the shareholders, inasmuch as it
iH the officers who conduct business of the corporation.

What is essential, is that the corporations have no interrhange of assets, and one corporation does not use the
other merely to limit its liability. The general rule as
stated hy Judge Learned Hand in Kingston Dry Dock
Company v. the Lakr Champlain Transport Company,

l
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31 F.2d 265, is that the determination of whether to pierce
the corporate veil depends upon common control and
whether control is exercised to work a fraud. Thus,
the motion for summary judgment should have been
denied on the grounds that an issue of fact does remain
and that the Defendants affidavit did not di spell all
doubt concerning that issue.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs contend that it was improper to grant
Defendants motion to dismiss and Defendant, Midwest
H.ealty and Finance, Inc. 's motion for summary judgent. The motion to dismiss should not have been brought
inasmuch as the identical motion was made and denied
by a different Judge at a prior time. Plaintiffs' complaint did state a cause of action in fraud both at the
time Plaintiffs' entered into the I<:anwst l\loney Receipt
and Offer to Purchase Agreement with Defendants', and
at the time Defendants induced Plaintiffs to move into
the new home. The alleged fraud was perpetrated by Defrndants Yao Bowers and A. D. Coats. Their fraud
ma)- be lH'ld actionable against hoth the DPfrnclanb,
Midwest Realty and F'inance, Inc., and Defendant Midwest Construction Company on the basis of agency.
Furthermore, Defendant :Midwest Realty and Financt>
Company has not shown conclusively that it is not conducting business through :Midwest Construction Company, and tlwrefore, its motion for summary judgilll'nt
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~honld have been denied on the grounds that a factual
i:-sue still remains to be determined.

Respectfully Submitted,
Mitsunaga and Ross
By : Richard Leedy
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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